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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: This conceptual theoretical review aims to inform readers of the benefits and pitfalls 
of structured finance, when applied to “Third Sector” organisations. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: A literature review of existing studies and grey literature are 
considered in a critical evaluation of the risk governance of structured finance arrangements. 
Voluntary sector observers inform us, the ‘Third Sector’ comprises of ‘…nonprofits, charities, 
social enterprises, social movements, and other community-based. Clearly civil society 
organisation (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and supranational 
organisations should also be added to the list.  
Findings: ‘Quality control’ and ‘Social implications’ issues surrounding the effect of 
structured finance agreements on ‘Third Sector’ organisations are revealed.  
Practical Implications: This conceptual theoretical review details the ‘Practical implications 
of Third Sector organisation risk governance’ with structured finance. The breadth, depth and 
remit of these agencies, demonstrates the societal need for risk governance for all such third 
sector organisations. The paper explains why those needs may differ for larger, more 
corporate ‘Third Sector’ organisations.   
Originality/Value: It has become increasingly clear that structured finance arrangements, 
have the ability to influence the ethos, focus and legitimacy of ‘Third Sector’ organisations. 
Analysis of issues to consider, when implementing risk governance strategy regarding 
structured finance agreements has become critical.  
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There is a relative paucity of literature on studies investigating, does the influence of 
‘…if and how performance and compliance objectives become constitutive of 
managerial logics in use’ (Giddens, 1976), affect large more corporate ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations differently, compared with small grassroots enterprises, as regards risk 
governance. The risk finance governance community would benefit from an inquiry 
asking: What aspects of risk governance have the greatest affect upon ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations, considering entering into structured finance arrangements. There is 
literature critically appraising ‘Third Sector’ funding initiatives, e.g., Phillips and 
Hebb, (2010), ‘Financing the Third Sector’. However, the dichotomy of structured 
finance arrangements and their interaction with the analysis of risk governance, 
remains distinctly under-theorised regarding their relationship with ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations. 
 
The manner in which a ‘Third Sector’ organisation is financed, has a significant effect 
upon how that enterprise delivers its products and services; ‘…the way social 
enterprise are financed is a critical issue which reflects both quite distinct socio-
economic contexts and the very conceptions of social enterprise embedded in such 
contexts,…’ (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a). This demonstrates that structured 
finance arrangements, amongst others, can change the very nature of how a ‘Third 
Sector’ organisation operates, influencing for example which social missions an 
enterprise chooses to address (Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2020). 
Social enterprises have a number of particular features, one of which is the perception 
of questionable financial stability. “Social enterprises are generally viewed as 
organisations characterised by a significant level of economic risk” (Defourny and 
Nyssens, 2010a). Given the social purpose of ‘Third Sector’ organisations, there must 
be a mechanism which can mitigate financial risk if an organisation fails. Put simply, 
structured finance can be defined as a financial instrument which can be tailor made 
to suit the funding needs various enterprises. These are institutions where more 
mainstream funding wouldn’t be appropriate (European Commission-Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017). Social enterprises have a level 
of corporate social responsibility, a requirement to indemnify third party creditors if 
adverse events occur. Structured finance acts as a social glue delivering the indemnity 
and responsibility required, enabling communities to recover if a ‘Third Sector’ 
organisation collapses (Community Foundation, 2020). 
 
This paper borrows heavily from Nicholls’ (2010) ‘Institutionalizing social 
entrepreneurship in regulatory space’ study. Nicholls (2010) indicates two research 
avenues by which structured finance arrangements and risk governance within ‘Third 
Sector’ organisations can be investigated. There will be discussion on the controlling 
aspects of accounting as a governance practice, which act to reinforce hegemonic 
forces. There will be analysis of governance processes implemented by societal 
stakeholders, who have coalesced around a normative if not paradigmatic position. 
Discussion along these avenues, help to signpost how current disclosure and reporting 
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mechanisms have developed. Current audit practices, employed by ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations have been legitimised, becoming convention and accepted practice. 
Conceptualisation of how power structures and institutional behaviour, influence 
interactions between structured finance arrangements and risk governance policy 
formulation will be articulated (Milbourne and Cushman, 2013). 
 
The paper draw upon aspects of Nicholls’ (2009) ‘Blended Values Accounting’ work, 
to provide a theoretical underpinning for the research. Nicholls’ (2009) study acts to 
contextualise the practical and social implications of structured finance arrangements 
and risk governance considerations. Policy recommendations included, are designed 
to enable ‘Third Sector’ organisations to operationalise effective risk governance. Fig 
1 is a graphical abstract, a roadmap, included to visualise the issues discussed and 




2. Competing Definitions of Risk Governance 
 
There is an early complication in this conceptual discussion, there are numerous 
definitions of risk governance. Benn et al.’s (2009) definition of governance is broad 
and contemporary, with a focus upon ‘…where public-private interaction enables 
sustaining coordination and coherence between a wide variety of actors’ (Pierre 2000 
cited in Benn et al., 2009). ‘Sustaining coordination’ introduces the concept of 
economic and social risk. Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a similar related risk 
governance definition. Tekathen and Dechow (2013) inform the reader that “COSO 
defines ERM as set of activities that lead to organizational alignment and 
accountability, given structured work with stable, mobile and combinable information 
objects.” COSO is a quintet of US based professional associations, which focus upon 
three interrelated themes: ‘ERM, internal control and fraud deterrence’ (ibid: 101). 
Discussion on ERM is included as it has a generic function, helping to signpost some 
of the key concepts in formulating risk governance strategy. Literature analysis 
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suggests that Nicholls (2009; 2010) would argue the COSO definition of ERM is too 
simplistic. Nicholls’ (2009; 2010) critique would probably be COSO has a one-
dimensional definition of accountability, alongside a limiting benchmarking ethos. 
Similarly, literature analysis indicates that Defourny and Nyssens, (2010a) would also 
be critical of ERM for a different reason. Defourny and Nyssens, (2010a) argue ERM 
is flawed as it’s designed to integrate and align strategic corporate objectives, an 
approach imbued with neoliberalism. “Neoliberalism is a political economic concept, 
a set of ideas, or even a framework used to describe the commodification of all sectors 
of society” (Cahill et al., 2012). There are numerous other modern definitions of 
neoliberalism. The above serves to contextualise some of the themes conceptualised 
in risk governance in this discussion (Bach-Mortensen and Montgomery, 2018). 
 
3. Competing Definitions of Social Enterprises  
 
Aka ‘Third Sector’ organisations 
The definition of a social enterprise is also complex as it differs significantly from one 
country to another. In the UK in 2002, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
defined a social enterprise as: “a business with primarily social objectives whose 
surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the 
community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders 
and owners” (DTI, 2002, cited in Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a). 
 
Other ‘Third Sector’ observers view social enterprises as a special category of NGO, 
saying ‘…social enterprises are not-for-profit organisations driven by social mission’ 
(Sullivan Mort et al., 2003, cited in Sakarya et al., 2012). The US definition of a social 
enterprise is an organisation that trades for a social purpose. This is a market driven 
neoliberal approach, complete with an ‘earned income’ concept of social enterprise. 
In this sense the US definition is very similar to German or UK approach, countries 
who view social enterprises as a business first and foremost. That said, it is also 
recognised that currently, businesses are expected to deliver economic and non-
economic fringe benefits to their shareholders. Businesses gain legitimacy by being 
seen to sponsor various good causes or events, perceived as solving a social problem 
of mutual concern. Such enterprises are valued by various constituencies, some of who 
have financial interest in the business concerned (Smith 2007, cited in Sakarya et al., 
2012). Most European definitions of social enterprise have different degrees of 
emphasis on the common theme, of social enterprise being about outcomes e.g. 
‘social, environmental or financial that add considerable value to their community’. 
This approach is sometimes referred to as ‘blended value’ (Phillip and Hebb, 2010; 
Nicholls, 2009). The central initiative should be focussed upon addressing social and 
societal challenges, such as disadvantaged groups being unable to access stable 
employment (Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a; EC SBI Report 2019).2 
 
2This report is dated October 2018. The European Commission inform us, updates have been 
added since first publication of the SBI final report. This version was published on 14 August 
2019. 
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4. Third Sector Organisations Governance of Risk: Themes, Criteria and 
Dimensions 
 
Defourny (2001) informs the risk finance and governance community, that ‘Third 
Sector’ initiatives have four common themes which demonstrate their economic and 
entrepreneurial dimensions. These four criteria are: a continuous activity producing 
goods and/or selling services; a high degree of autonomy; a significant level of 
economic risk; a minimum amount of paid work (Defourny, 2001, cited in Defourny 
and Nyssens, 2010). Research needs to investigate, to what extent and in what ways 
do each of these economic and entrepreneurial dimensions, influence risk governance 
assessment. Research needs to expand further into the feasibility of structured finance 
for ‘Third Sector’ organisations, in relation to the risk governance issues to consider. 
The research needs to identify which aspects make a proposed structured finance 
arrangement being considered feasible. For example not overlapping with a nearby 
institution, in socio, political or economic terms. Such research would provide the 
voluntary community with a direction finder, a decision making tool by which to 
assess a structure finance proposal. The research would assist the reader to locate risk 
governance, relative to the entrepreneurial, economic and social dimensions of ‘Third 
Sector’ organisations (IRGC: Oberle et al., 2019).  
 
Defourny (2001) also informs that to encapsulate the social dimensions of ‘Third 
Sector’ initiatives, five criteria for social enterprise have been proposed. These are: an 
explicit aim to benefit the community; an initiative launched by a group of citizens; a 
decision-making power not based on capital ownership; a participatory nature, which 
involves various parties affected by the activity; a limited profit distribution 
(Defourny, 2001, cited in Defourny and Nyssens, 2010a). Defourny’s (2001) work is 
supported by numerous other studies, which have commented on how the perception 
of good governance is increased, by aligning the expectations of very different 
stakeholders. The tools and processes researchers have observed being used towards 
managing well-functioning stakeholder relationships, have in part employed facets of 
Defourny’s five criteria of social enterprise (Azbug and Galaskiewicz, 2001; Balser 
and McCluskey, 2005; Brown, 2005; Herman and Renz, 2008; Hsieh, 2010; Kilby 
2006; Ospina et al., 2002; Studer and von Sturneibein 2012, cited in Wellens and 
Jegers, 2014). The voluntary community needs to know, the nature in which each of 
these social dimensions affect the risk governance of ‘Third Sector’ organisations. The 
Defourny (2001) and Wellens and Jegers’ (2014) studies are underpinned by the 
‘communicative action’ approach (Habermas, 1984). Here, social actors, discuss 
social challenges collaboratively, reaching a common understanding and consensus as 
to how and which societal problem should be addressed. Key to such discussions, 
would be issues which belong in the economic, entrepreneurial and social dimensions 
of ‘Third Sector’ activity (Smith and Neal, CNPR 2019, 3 September 2019).3 
 
3Smith and Neal presented this paper at the Charities, Nonprofits and Ngos: (Re)building and 
Legitimacy (CNPR) 2019 Conference, at the Queen’s University, Belfast, 3 and 4 September 
2019. 
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Research has tended to focus upon the relationship between corporate governance, 
economic risk and reward. This approach comes from the neoliberal tradition, being 
hierarchical in approach, with an emphasis upon growth and investment return. Here 
‘Third Sector’ organisations are viewed as a business. Risk governance also needs to 
consider the wellbeing of the organisation, how it interacts with the people in the area 
where it serves. “For success and survival, in shaping its strategies, a business 
enterprise has to take into consideration its interactions with the non-market 
component of its environment, comprising of public, government, stakeholders, media 
and public institutions” (Baron 1995; Baron 2010; Hemphill 2005, cited in Sakarya et 
al., 2012).  
 
There needs to be research to investigate, should risk governance focus upon the 
economic risk in an organisation; or should other factors be considered e.g., 
transparency, or closeness of fit with societal objectives (Blaser and Carmin, 2009; 
Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006, cited in Wellens and Jegers, 2014; De Cooman et al., 
2011; Moynihan and Pandey, 2007). The arrival of the COVID-19 global pandemic, 
brought issues of flexibility and fitting in with societal needs into sharp focus. Many 
‘Third Sector’ organisations globally changed their normal service, e.g. usually 
supporting people with no access to affordable childcare, to food bank delivery. 
Similarly local mutual aid groups have seen a significant upturn globally in their 
membership and activity, due to the Coronavirus crisis (Local Government 
Association, 2 June 2020; Mutual Aid Networks, 24 March 2020; World Economic 
Forum Civil Society, 29 May 2020). 
 
5. Practical Implications of Third Sector Organisation Risk Governance 
 
LaBelle (2012) reaffirms an earlier part of this discussion that risk governance has 
more than one definition. In part this is due to how the relationship of governance 
operates differently between stakeholders. “The term governance must be broken 
down to more precisely account for the different activities of institutions and actors” 
(LaBelle, 2012). The most apt definition of stakeholder can be found in Freeman’s 
(1984) seminal work on stakeholder theory, which defines stakeholders “as any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by an organisation’s achievements” 
(Freeman, 1984, cited in Wellens and Jegers, 2014). It is important to realise that 
different stakeholders have different remits, dependent upon their relationship with 
the organisation in which they have an interest. As such, ‘…there is no reason to 
expect that all stakeholders have identical objectives’ (Balser and McCluskey, 2005; 
cited in Van Puyvelde et al., 2012).  
 
Hawkey et al.’s (2013) discussion on urban energy systems, demonstrate how local or 
municipal authorities are key social actors in structured finance schemes, and for 
resulting models of risk governance adopted (Hawkey et al., 2013). The types of 
‘Third Sector’ organisations investigated in Hawkey et al.’s (2013) study, are typical 
in illuminating how risk governance operates differently, between small community-
based social enterprises and larger ‘Third Sector’ organisations. This is particularly 
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important when analysing the effectiveness of internal auditing, or other reporting 
mechanisms as tools to assess risk governance (Ball, 2016; Charity Finance Group, 
SORP 13 February 2020).4 
 
Risk governance can also be said to come in two forms, behaviourally and relationally 
(Gidron, 2010).5 The behavioural patterns of an organisation, its fiscal arrangements, 
its efficiency and growth strategy, form part of an organisation’s behaviour. The 
interaction between an organisation and the institutional ownership relationships in 
the locality, is another area where how an organisation’s behaviour manifests itself 
has to be taken into consideration. Bulmer et al. (2007) give us an indication of the 
influence of institutional behaviour. “Institutions shape the preference of actors and 
shape the policy making process and how policy making implementation is carried 
out.” Behaviourally, an organisation’s relationship with its shareholders and other 
local stakeholders, is important in the assessment of risk governance (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013). These relationships can be very sensitive at the micro level, 
especially with small ‘Third Sector’ organisations such as advice centres for disabled 
persons, lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, transgender (LGBT) people, substance abusers, or 
food banks. Often relationships develop as a result of the involvement of stakeholders 
in the decision-making process, applying a democratic perspective (Comforth, 2003, 
cited in Gidron, 2010). Here a broad, value-based, lay approach is used, as opposed to 
an ‘expert-dominance’ process; during governance discussions on changes in goals, 
perspectives, or the very ethos and ideology of an organisation (Gidron, 2010). More 
mainstream auditors recognise the relational aspects of stakeholder involvement in 
their risk assessments (Kaplan Bank, 2020). 
 
Another issue ‘Third Sector’ organisations need to consider regarding the suitability 
of a structured finance arrangement is, would participation in a specific scheme, affect 
the relationship(s) with another current funder(s) (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). 
Similarly, internal and external stakeholders may no longer be willing to volunteer or 
to make donations; if the social enterprise they previously supported; has now engaged 
with a funding stream they do not approve of. For example arms manufacture, 
pharmaceuticals tested on animals, blood diamonds, products made from ivory, or 
fracking (Guo, 2006; cited in Gidron, 2010). There is a globalisation facet to this 
element of structured finance, which influences risk governance of the ‘Third Sector’. 
Some of the external stakeholders and/or funders could be internationally based, in 
relation to the social enterprise. When considering entering into a new structured 
finance arrangement, risk governance has to assess the existing political or regional 
landscape, which might include a military alliance. ‘Third Sector’ organisations need 
to have robust risk governance systems in place, to analyse sensitive complex 
situations. There needs to be careful consideration before deciding whether to proceed 
with a particular project using structured finance. A proposal that could destabilise 
effective working relationships, which currently exist inter-regionally, or 
 
4SORP is an acronym for Statement of Recommended Practice. 
5Benjamin Gidron’s study was on non-profit organisations (NPO). 
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geographically between countries at the mezzo-level (Becker 2001; Sztompka 1994; 
cited in Sakarya et al. 2012; see locally ESRC ILG, Chapman et al., 2018).6 
 
In most developed countries the formal task of risk governance, in smaller voluntary 
‘Third Sector’ organisations, will be carried out by internal auditors. Analysis of the 
role of an internal auditor reveals an entry to the problem constellation. “Current 
governance regulations are not designed to regulate the activities of internal auditors” 
(Archambeault et al., 2008; Holt and DeZoort, 2009; Messier 2009; cited in Roussy, 
2013). Further investigation informs the reader that the internal auditor’s role can be 
split in two. A protector role, which itself can be subdivided into a keeper of secrets 
and a protective shield. There is also a helper role, which can be subdivided into a 
guidance role and an organisational performance role (Roussy, 2013). Melanie 
Roussy’s (2013) study is on the public sector. I argue Roussy’s (2013) research, also 
applies to any ‘Third Sector’ organisation that is required to conduct internal audits as 
well (CIPFA: Diana Melville, 17 May 2019; NHS Guidelines, September 2017).7 
 
The internal audits as described by Roussy (2013) are reporting practices that are 
‘…consistent with the ‘bricolage’ evident in social entrepreneurship’ attitude to 
problem-solving more generally’ (Nicholls, 2009). A brief discussion on reporting 
practices has become germane, when analysing the governance of structure finance 
agreements. Reporting practices act as mechanism to describe any structured finance 
arrangements a ‘Third Sector’ organisation has. They double as a panopticon, 
analysing the existing risk governance strategy, reporting back on potential risks not 
considered (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 8 June 2020). Palmer and 
Vinten’s (1998) study on charity reporting, provides an analysis of approaches that 
can be adapted to demonstrate how the financial wellbeing of a ‘Third Sector’ 
organisation, can be disclosed and audited. Financial reporting can be ‘positivist’ (i.e. 
reporting data represents empirical reality (Whittington, 1986); ‘critical theorist’ (i.e. 
reporting data activates control mechanisms (Chua, 1986; Lukes, 1974; Power and 
Loughlin, 1986); ‘interpretative’ (i.e. reporting data acts as a symbolic mediator or 
space for discussion between organisational practice and stakeholders (Gambling et 
al., 1993; Ryan et al. 1992, all from Palmer and Vinten’s (1998) study, cited in 
Nicholls, 2009).  
 
Financial reporting or accounting mechanisms being ‘a symbolic function’ and thus 
effectively being subject to interpretation, is mentioned by numerous researchers e.g. 
Hester et al. (2009), cited in Wellens and Jegers (2014). It’s this theoretical chaos of 
to some stakeholders valid, and to others contested, interpretations of how the 
financial standing of a ‘Third Sector’ organisation can be reported that’s 
problematical. 
 
6ESRC ILG is an acronym for Economic and Social Research Council Institute for Local 
Governance. 
7Diana Melville is governance adviser at the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA). 
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Considering a structured finance arrangement and whether any changes should be 
made to the organisations current risk governance strategy is challenging. A 
‘positivist’ audit practice could be accepted by some, yet deemed to be misleading by 
others. ‘Critical theorist’ auditing increases the propensity for stakeholders to ask, at 
what level should control mechanisms kick in, should it be a, b, or somewhere in 
between. An ‘interpretative’ audit could be accepted, except for those claiming this is 
creative accounting. Roussy’s (2013) and Palmer and Vinten’s (1998) studies amongst 
others, demonstrate how problematical it is in practice, to implement effective risk 
governance. Analysis of structured finance agreements in ‘Third Sector’ organisations 
is quite complex, especially if a ‘blended value’ accounting approach is preferred 
(Nicholls, 2009; see also Structured Finance Association, 6 June 2020). 
  
Nicholls (2009) ‘Blended Value’ accounting study is underscored by many other 
studies. There are a surfeit of complimentary studies, demonstrating the effects of 
neoliberalism in the form of inappropriate Government focus on performance 
management on governance. Alexander, Nank and Stivers (1999) argued the emphasis 
on outcomes and targets, impeded non-profit organisations (NPOs) from pursuing 
their social objectives. They also argued that the Government-led impetus to 
professionalise how a NPO delivered its service, resulted in some clients not being 
stimulated to participate. This had a negative impact on risk governance of the ‘Third 
Sector’ organisation, as stakeholders were not being involved in decision-making and 
policy-making (Wellens and Jegers, 2014). Guo (2007) raised similar concerns 
arguing access to government funding is very time-consuming, often resulting in a 
lowering of grassroots community representation in favour of professionalisation.  
 
This has a debilitating effect upon the monitoring quality of the NPO, as the primary 
objective of ameliorating a societal challenge has been undermined. Nowland-
Foreman (1998) also argue there is a loss of volunteer support when a NPO engages 
with government funding. Suarez (2011) warns of negative side-effects associated 
with creeping professionalisation e.g. increased difficulties with risk governance (all 
cited in Wellens and Jegers, 2014). Nicholls (2009; 2010) and other researchers up to 
2011, demonstrate there has been a dislocation between the grassroots and the ‘Third 
Sector’ organisations. Ordinary people are less likely to choose to engage, due to a 
neo-liberalistic motivated drive towards professionalism. Research from Van 
Puyvelde et al. (2012), Sakarya et al. (2012), Claessens and Yurtoglu, (2013), and 
Wellens and Jegers (2014), illustrate the unintended consequences of such impetus. 
There is an existential threat that onerous or practically irrelevant risk governance 
scrutiny afforded to structured finance arrangements, could impede voluntary 
engagement. Overly burdensome scrutiny, the drive towards professionalisation have 
become constituents of an already burgeoning problem constellation in the 2020s 
(Edmiston and Nicholls, 2018; Northern Ireland Department of Finance, 7 May 
2020).8 
 
8The Northern Ireland reference clearly supports a neoliberal approach to governance and 
risk, whilst the Edmiston and Nicholls contribution acts as a critique. 
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6. Social Implications 
 
There is little emphasis on how poor risk governance can lead to valuable social goods, 
not being delivered by local voluntary community groups. Social resources no longer 
being available due to the failure of a ‘Third Sector’ organisation. Lack of oversight 
on a structured finance arrangement, could lead to the closure of important amenities. 
Social resources such as youth, substance misuse or domestic violence hostels, with 
added support to aid re-housing could fall. Here flawed risk governance has caused 
organisational failure at the micro level (Becker 2001; Sztompka 1994, cited in 
Sakarya et al., 2012). In the event of such failure, large voluntary groups could make 
the operational decision to avoid structured finance arrangements. Such a decision by 
community enterprises would lead to less social goods being delivered at the national 
level. This is market failure caused by poor risk governance of large ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations. Essentially this is voluntary group organisational failure at the macro 
and meso level (Wauters, European Commission, 2017). 
 
Inappropriate risk governance of structured finance schemes is paralleled in PFI 
(Private Finance Initiatives) review discussions. Froud (2003) effectively argued that 
it’s implicit that PFI schemes, which can be described as a structured finance 
arrangement, increase the likelihood of organisational and/or market failure.  The 
attractiveness of PFI schemes to the private sector, act to undermine the Government’s 
social responsibility of being the service provider and risk bearer of last resort (Froud, 
2003, cited in Asenova and Beck, 2010). PFI schemes appear to be set to cost the UK 
£301billion pounds, with annual repayments averaging at approximately £6billion, 
peaking in 2017-18 at £10.1billion (Campbell et al., 2012; see also BBC News 18 
January 2018). The potential for the social debacle of important amenities brought 
into being by PFI funding subsequently closing is abundantly clear. The growing 
reality that many such PFI projects will in all likelihood fail, serves as a warning to 
‘Third Sector’ organisations. Structured finance schemes albeit on a smaller scale than 
PFI can go awry, if risk governance strategies are not properly formulated. 
 
Kerr (1998, cited in Asenova and Beck, 2010) makes a contribution in the PFI review 
discussion, which can be seen to have a dual purpose. It also acted as a precursor to 
Nicholls (2009) ‘blended value’ work. Kerr (1998) argues that enterprises considering 
PFI, are forced to go through organisational transformations and appraisal methods 
which are neoliberal in nature. Kerr (1998) describes how organisations are moulded 
by the PFI compliance process, along a road of objectification, professionalisation and 
marketisation to implement service delivery. Kerr’s (1998) critique, has profound 
accountability policy implications to this day in the 2020s. PFI schemes foster 
neoliberalism, market-based approaches, with the potential to erode socially conscious 
labour practices that exist in the public sector. “This in turn can lead to a situation 
where public expectations of fairness and social justice are no longer met” (Kerr, 
1998, cited in Asenova and Beck 2010). We can see that Kerr’s argument has come 
to pass. Kerr (1998) is echoed not just by Nicholls (2009; 2010), but more recently, 
by Claessen and Nyssens (2013), Sakarya et al. (2012), Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) 
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and Wellens and Jegers (2014). It can be argued that O’ Hara (2018) provides the most 
critically reflective critique of PFI. What is perhaps most surprising, is that worrying 
aspects of PFI are presented from research commissioned by the Tony Blair Institute 
for Global Change. Tony Blair was the UK Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007. 
 
There are ethical considerations. The source of a structured finance scheme might 
offend some voluntary group’s stakeholders e.g. arms manufacturers, blood diamonds 
or fracking (VolResource, 2019). An inappropriate choice of structured finance 
agreement, might encourage a boycott of a ‘Third Sector’ organisation’s products or 
services. “From an institutional perspective, legitimacy is a vital resource for a firm 
and can be obtained by abiding with the normative, coercive and cognitive pressures 
emerging from the institutional environment” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Palmer 
and Biggart, 2002; Strang and Sine, 2002, cited in Sakarya et al., 2012). 
 
7. Quality Control: Trust Indicators in ‘Third Sector’ Risk Governance 
 
The problem constellation brought to our attention by Palmer and Vinten’s (1998) 
charities study, can be partly offset by ‘systems trust’ (Giddens, 1990; cited in 
Nicholls, 2009). ‘System trust’ is where certain approaches become recognised 
practice, as alluded to in Roussy’s (2013) study on internal auditors in the public 
sector. Here ‘systems trust’ provides a proxy for personalised interactions, this could 
be between internal or external stakeholders. Similarly the recognised practice could 
be assimilated by service users, the wider public, and/or other social purpose 
organisations (Power, 2007; cited in Nicholls, 2009). As discussed earlier, auditors 
Kaplan Financial Knowledge Bank (2020), consider personal interactions between 
stakeholders during risk assessments. ‘Systems trust’ also helps underscore Gidron’s 
(2010) description of relational aspects of risk governance.  
 
Third Sector organisations are given trust for a number of reasons. Principally due to 
their stated purposes identified in social mission statements and organisational form, 
observers can see a non-for-profit approach. In this context, enterprises activities 
‘…have traditionally acted as risk mitigation proxies for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of management and operations…’ (Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Edwards 
and Hulme, 1996; cited in Nicholls 2009). Organisations with a non-distributive 
requirement are also given trust, such enterprises have less of a need for reporting 
practices such as internal audits (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990; cited in Nicholls, 
2009). Trust is also given to voluntary groups, especially those awarded charitable 
status. ‘Third Sector’ organisations credentialised by charitable status, now have a 
certain level of trust conferred by assimilated proxy. Charitable voluntary groups due 
to risk governance compliance procedures, now convey they are acting responsibly in 
their financial affairs (The Governance Group webinars Parts 1 and 2, 13-14 May 
2020). 
 
Some ‘Third Sector’ organisations are NGOs, who are given trust in the form of being 
‘…granted a societal mandate to represent the public interest on specific issues by 
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virtue of their stated independence’ (Nicholls, 2009). Trust given in this manner for 
these reasons, is described as ‘cognitive legitimacy surplus’ (Jepson, 2005; Lister, 
2003; Nicholls, 2008; Schumann, 1995; cited in Nicholls, 2009). Cognitive legitimacy 
surplus, which essentially is a tacitly agreed convention for many ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations, operates on multiple levels. It could act to influence an organisation 
decisions regarding funding sources proposed in a structured finance arrangement.  
 
Cognitive legitimacy surplus decision making can also extend to consideration of the 
type of scrutiny a ‘Third Sector’ organisation undertakes. For example an area wide 
decision could be agreed, that all qualifying voluntary organisations should not be 
subject to a positivist critical audit. This enables the risk governance strategy 
formulated for an organisation to be less incisive, if present at all. Cognitive 
legitimacy surplus has had two main effects upon ‘Third Sector’ organisations, one it 
reduces public accountability (Jacobs, 2006; Jepson, 2005; cited in Nicholls, 2009). 
The other effect is it motivates a lack of scrutiny. There has been reduced incentive 
for ‘Third Sector’ organisations to become more efficient with future operational 
improvements, or be strategically innovative (Egholm et al., 2020; Nicholls, 2009; see 
also The National Council for Voluntary Organisations, UK Civil Society Almanac 
2019). 
 
Potentially, cognitive legitimacy surplus, could be an addition to the problem 
constellation, acting to undermine the work of ‘Third Sector’ organisations. Due to a 
perceived lack of candour and transparency, lenders or auditors risk assessments could 
become less favourable. In turn this ‘…could, ultimately, have serious negative 
resource implications’ (Jepson, 2005; cited in Nicholls, 2009). The potential for 
cognitive legitimacy surplus to be very damaging to ‘Third Sector’ organisations, 
demonstrates the importance of robust risk governance. The requirement for critical 
scrutiny which is fit for purpose of voluntary groups becomes particularly acute, 
especially if structured finance arrangements are involved. The discussion has also 
revealed that whatever reporting practices are adopted, they need to fully disclose how 
societal challenges are being met, and accurately represent the financial health of the 
‘Third Sector’ organisation in focus.  
 
The normative logic contained in some of the social policy drivers behind the UK 
legislation of CIC34 (Community Interest Company 34) reporting requirements are 
supported. The social policy drivers include ‘…good governance, sound fiscal policies 
and a transparency of operation’ (CIC Regulator 2006; cited in Nicholls, 2010). The 
discourse used by CIC Regulators then and in the 2020s now, is evidence of wider 
normative power structures. By definition the discourse is paradigmatic in nature. That 
is not necessarily a negative outcome, if it helps ‘Third Sector’ organisations to access 
sufficient funds to deliver societal needs  (Figueiredo, 2019, Good Governance 
Institute Blog; GOV.UK, Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, 
2 June 2020b; Pantzerhielm et al., 2020). 
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There is a critique that some reporting practices contribute towards inappropriately 
legitimising the logics of social enterprise (Dart, 2004; cited in Nicholls, 2009). This 
results in bad practice which is a form of poor risk governance. The societal benefit 
of CIC34 reporting, is that cognitive, normative and pragmatic legitimacy is delivered. 
Underpinned by the necessity to include the social remit of the ‘Third Sector’ 
organisations activity (Nicholls, 2010). CIC34 reporting also places a statutory duty 
on UK based ‘Third Sector’ organisations, to consult with stakeholders (BIS, 2013; 
GOV.UK, CIC34 company report example, 2 June 2020a).9 Yes hegemonic and 
paradigmatic forces are at play, and are being reinforced by the operational mechanics 
of CIC34 reporting.  
 
However earlier discussion has revealed what could potentially happen to a social 
enterprise if there is insufficient oversight. The unintended consequences of disclosure 
and auditing being absent, could produce cognitive legitimacy surplus potentially 
resulting in market failure. ‘Third Sector’ organisations and the wider society benefit, 
from being afforded the protection delivered by CIC34 reporting, irrespective of the 
neo-liberalistic discourse. The importance of ‘Blended Value Accounting’, a variant 
model of which is used in CIC34 reporting, can’t be understated (Nicholls, 2010). This 
is especially apparent when structured finance arrangements and the policy 
formulation of risk governance strategy are being considered (Third Sector Interview: 




In practice, small ‘Third Sector’ organisations, due to insufficient turnover, do not 
have to report their economic performance. Essentially many voluntary and 
community groups self-report. A number use an amalgamation of the ‘signification’ 
and ‘legitimisation’ dimensions of structuration (Giddens 1984; Giddens 1991).10 Still 
others use a social constructivist (Gergen, 2002) ‘systems trust’ relationship approach 
to demonstrate compliance with common shared values.  By recognition from their 
peers, many community-based enterprises are given what can be classed as a quasi-
self-audit licence. This quasi-self-audit licence, is conferred by other stakeholders 
which helps to underpin the legitimacy of the enterprise in receipt. Peer approval helps 
reinforce both the receiver and the giver, of their status of being one of the many types 
of ‘Third Sector’ organisation (Phillips and Hebb, 2010). The quasi-self-licence I have 
described, is similar to the ‘SLO’ (social licence to operate), acquired from local 
communities by mineral developers in Canada (Prno and Slocombe, 2012). However 
my quasi-self-license operates at a much smaller scale, at the grassroots level. The 
quasi-self-licence is a logical extension of legitimacy theory, where an enterprise must 
have legitimacy in the form of a social “licence to operate” (Deegan, 2002; cited in 
 
9CIC34 report example is dated 9 March 2009, the GOV.UK website page was updated 2 June 
2020. 
10Giddens explains structuration theory, in a book chapter volume edited by Bryant and Jary 
(1991). 
   Ben Duke 
63  
 
Hahn and Kuhnen, 2013). The process by which ‘Third Sector’ organisations receive 
a quasi-self-licence can also be seen through the lens of neo-institutionalist theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Contrafatto, 2009; cited in Contrafatto, 2011). Prno and 
Slocombe’s (2012) ‘SLO’ study and Giddens (1984) ‘communicative action’ theory 
provide further support. They help to conceptualise how there has been a paradigm 
shift in factors to be assessed in risk governance policy formation. There is widespread 
recognition that the needs of non-state actors in ‘Third Sector’ organisations must be 
prioritised, if societal challenges are to be met (The King’s Fund: Wenzel and 
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